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PUBLIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Donald H. Wollett*
This survey does not purport to set forth and discuss all of
the cases involving issues of state and federal constitutional law
decided by the State Supreme Court at the last term. Coverage
is limited to those decisions which seem to be particularly note-
worthy. The cases selected deal with the pre-emptive effect of
the Smith Act,' equal protection of the laws and the state" statute
making miscegenation a crime, delegation of legislative power
to administrative tribunals, legislative limitations on the .power
of the courts to issue equitable relief, and the negative implica-
tions of the Commerce Clause restricting state power to tax
interstate businesses. The decisions will be discussed in this
order.
PRE-EMPTION AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY
State v. Jenkins2 involved a defendant charged with violating
the State Subversive Activities Law 3 by being a member Of the
Communist Party with knowledge of its foreign subversive char-
acter. The State Supreme Court affirmed the district judge's
granting of a motion to quash on the ground that the Smith
Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson,4 pre-empts state power to enforce such
legislation.
The Smith Act prohibits advocacy of the overthrow of the
government of the United States by force and violence, and the
exact issue in the Nelson case, to which the Supreme Court of
the United States gave a negative answer, was whether a state
could proscribe the same conduct.
Thus the Nelson decision left open the question of whether
a state may prohibit advocacy of overthrow of local government
by force and violence. As might be expected, the prosecutor
pressed the point in the Jenkins case that the Nelson decision
does not foreclose a state from punishing acts of sedition against
local government. However, the State Supreme Court, reason-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 54 STAT. 670 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1959).
2. 236 La. 300, 107 So.2d 648 (1958).
3. LA. R.S. 14:366-380 (1950).
4. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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ing that membership in the Communist Party with knowledge
of its objectives necessarily involves subversive activity against
the United States as well as the State of Louisiana, rejected the
argument.
The court specifically reserved judgment on the question of
what it will do with a case which involves only acts of sedition
committed against the state government. It is now clear, since
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States last
term in Uphaus v. Wyman,5 that the Nelson doctrine does not
operate to pre-empt state power in that situation.
Accordingly, future enforcement of the State Subversive Ac-
tivities Law will probably be largely under R.S. 14:367, which
makes it a felony to engage in prescribed subversive acts, with
the bills of information or indictment drawn so as to limit the
charged offense to acts or the advocacy of acts involving the
violent overthrow of the government of the State of Louisiana
or its political subdivisions.
Enforcement of R.S. 14:368, which makes it a felony to belong
to a subversive organization with knowledge of its subversive
character, will be more difficult. However, the Jenkins decision
does not necessarily seem to foreclose a charge drawn under
that section, provided that it specifies that the organization is
subversive, as the term is disjunctively defined in R.S. 14:366,
solely because it advocates overthrow of local government by
force or violence.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AND MISCEGENATION
State v. Brown6 involved two persons convicted of the crime
of miscegenation in violation of Article 79 of the Louisiana
Criminal Code, which provides: "Miscegenation is the marriage
or habitual cohabitation with knowledge of their difference in
race, between a person of the Caucasian or white race and a
person of the colored or negro race."
Relying on the case of Pace v. Alabama,7 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that the statute does not violate the equal
protection and due process clauses of either the Louisiana or the
United States Constitutions. In the court's view, marriage is
a status of specialized local interest, and a state statute which
5. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
6. 236 La. 562, 108 So.2d 233 (1959).
7. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
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prohibits intermarriage between members of different races is
permissible because of the state's interest in preventing the
propagation of hybrid children who will have difficulty in gain-
ing acceptance in the society.
However, the court reversed the conviction and granted a
new trial on the ground of error in the tiial judge's instructions
to the jury in which he defined the term "habitual cohabitation,"
as used in the statute, as "access for the purpose of sexual inter-
course as a matter of habit." Drawing an analogy to the deci-
sions construing the term "cohabitation," as used in Article 78
of the Criminal Code dealing with the crime of incest, the court
held that "cohabitation" means sexual intercourse, and that
"habitual cohabitation" means customary or repeated acts of
sexual intercourse.
On the point of constitutional law, Pace v. Alabama affords
solid support for the court's position insofar as it holds that a
state has power to make extra-maritai cohabitation between
whites and Negroes a greater crime against the community than
extra-marital cohabitation between members of the same race.
The Pace case involved an Alabama statute which punished
adultery or fornication when committed by a white and a Negro
more severely than when committed by persons of the same race.
In a short and unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Field, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that the Alabama statute
did not offend the guarantee of equal protection of the laws
because the white person who had engaged in inter-racial sexual
relations was subject to punishment as severe as the Negro par-
ticipant.
The opinion made clear that a state has the power to treat
bi-racial extra-marital sexual relations as a greater offense
against the community than mono-racial extra-marital sexual
relations. Although the point was not articulated by Mr. Justice
Field, the existence of such power must necessarily rest upon the
proposition that a state legislature may rationally believe that
the former conduct poses a greater threat to public health,
safety, morals, and welfare than the latter; or, to put it dif-
ferently, that there is a reasonable basis for the classification.
It does not necessarily follow, however, from the Pace de-
cision, that a state may refuse to permit the members of dif-
ferent races to enter into a marital relationship. Such a con-
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clusion is permissible only if the implicit proposition of the Pace
case is extended to include, as a reasonable legislative belief,
that bi-racial marriages pose threats to public health, safety,
morals, or welfare that mono-racial marriages do not.
! The Louisiana court accepted that proposition in State v.
Brown, and there is little doubt that, if orthodox equal-protec-
tion-of-the-laws theory is applicable to the situation, the court's
disposition of the federal constitutional question is sound. All
of the states that have faced the problem have, with the excep-
tion of California, reached the same conclusion.8
The trouble is that a lot of water, notably Brown v. Board of
Education,9 has gone under the dam since Pace v. Alabama was
decided in 1883. Marriage is controlled by the states, but so is
public school education. Surely a state legislature may reason-
ably believe that there is a rational relationship between pre-
venting the propagation of hybrid youngsters and the public
welfare. But, by the same token, one may reasonably believe
that there is a rational relationship between maintaining racially-
segregated public schools and preventing violence and inter-
racial friction. Yet this is not, under the holding in Cooper v.
Aaron,10 a valid reason for excluding children from specified
public schools solely by reason of their race.
Analytically, a statute prohibiting miscegenation does not
raise the question of racial discrimination, for such a statute
operates as fully against white persons who desire such a marital
relationship as it does against Negroes. The real question posed
is one of freedom of association.
However, the same thing may be said about state-enforced
segregation in public facilities. Assuming that the separate fa-
cilities are in fact equal in every way susceptible to proof, the
segregation system works as much against whites as it does
against Negroes, that is, it deprives each racial group of what-
8. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) ; State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d
882 (1942) ; Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895) ; Jackson v. Denver,
109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942) ; Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869) ; State
v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871) ; State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883) ; In re Shun
T. Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942) ; State v. Kennedy, 76
N.C. 232 (1877) ; In re Paquet's Estate, 101 Ore. 393, 200 Pac. 911 (1921);
Londs V. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871) ; Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877).
But see Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
9. '347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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lever.' benefits are derived from "mixing." Again the real! issue
is: one'of freedom of association.
Thus, the state-enforced segregation cases have precedential
force so far as the disposition of the miscegenation problem is
coiicerned. This is not to say, and certainly not to predict, that
ithe Supreme Court, applying the principle of Brown v. Board
of Education, should or will strike down state statutes pro-
hibiting inter-racial marriages. Such a judgment or prognosis
would be fatuous until it is a good deal clearer than it is now
exactly what the principle of Brown v. Board of Education is.
The Supreme Court of the United States has rather cavalier-
ly,i in a series of per curiam decisions, extended Brown v. Board
of Education to public transportation, parks, golf courses, bath
'houses, and beaches, without bothering to write any opinions
attempting to identify the principle of constitutional law in-
,Volved. Moreover in 1956, in Ham Say Naim v. Naim," the
court dismissed, per curiam, an appeal from a Virginia decision
-annulling a marriage, because it violated the state statute pro-
'hibiting miscegenetic marriages, on procedural grounds which
have been described as "wholly without basis in the law."'-,
'The handling of the Naim case is interesting because of what
it reveals about the Court's disposition to take hold of the mis-
.cegenation problem.
The statute at issue was squarely challenged by the defend-
ant on due process and equal protection grounds under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, in affirming the decree of the trial court, ruled square-
ly: against him on that question. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
the United States vacated the judgment and remanded the case
'for return to the trial court for reopening and development of
evidence as to the relationship of the parties to Virginia, so that
11. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958), affirming per curiam, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming per curiam, 142 F.Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) ;
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), reversing per curiam, 223 F.2d
,93 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955);
affirming per curiam, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) ; Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), reversing per curiam, 202 F.2d 275 (6th
Cir. 1953).1.. 12. 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on re-
.mand, 197 Va. 794, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
See also Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So.2d 114 (1954), certiorari
denied, 260 Ala. 698, 72 So.2d 116 (1954), certiorari denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
.- :13. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HA.v. L.
Rim. 1, 34 (1959).
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the constitutional question could be presented "in clear-cut and
concrete form," unclouded by the problem of an inadequate
record and the failure of the parties to raise all questions rel-
evant to the disposition of the case.
The record showed that the Chinese defendant and his Cau-
casian wife, the plaintiff, had left Virginia and gone to North
Carolina in order to evade the Virginia statute at issue. Im-
mediately after their marriage they had returned to Norfolk
and lived together as man and wife. The plaintiff was a resident
of Virginia at the time she instituted the action to annul the
marriage; the defendant was not. Apparently the Supreme
Court was disturbed because the record did not show whether
the parties were residents of Virginia when the marriage was
celebrated in North Carolina or when they set up housekeeping
in Norfolk.
The Virginia court, finding that the record was adequate to
support both the trial court's decision and its decision on review,
including of course disposition of the federal question, held that
the judgments were final as a matter of state law and that state
rules of practice and procedure did not permit such a case to be
returned to the trial court for reopening. Accordingly, the Vir-
ginia court adhered to its prior decision.
On the ground that the second decision by Virginia left the
case "devoid of a properly presented federal question," the Su-
preme Court denied a motion either to recall the mandate and
set the case for argument on the merits or to recall and amend
the mandate, and dismissed the appeal.
Its handling of the Naim case seems to be a clear manifesta-
tion of the Court's reluctance to come to grips with the mis-
cegenation problem. However, it is hard to believe that it will
not ultimately do so. It would be profoundly ironic, if not down-
right irresponsible, for the Court perfunctorily to extend Brown
v. Board of Education to a wide range of public facilities while
at the same time ducking the miscegenation question.
The principal difficulty for a lawyer with the state-enforced
segregation cases, whether one "likes" them or not, is, as Pro-
fessor Wechsler has put it: "[I]f ... freedom of association is
denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon
those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant." If the state
must, as a practical matter, "choose between denying the asso-
[Vol. XX
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ciation to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those
who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for
holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for asso-
ciation should prevail ?-14
If there is such a basis, the Court has thus far failed to
identify it. The Brown case itself was based either upon the
district court's finding of fact or upon judicial notice that the
separate-but-equal formula has no place in public school educa-
tion because segregated schools produce pernicious effects upon
colored youngsters, implying their inferiority, and thereby im-
peding their mental development. Thus they are "inherently
unequal." Aside from the troublesome question of whether the
evidence supported such findings or whether it Was proper court
behavior to take judicial notice of such "facts," Brown v. Board
of Education at least purported to rest upon proofs and dealt
only with the question of racial segregation in public facilities
which, under compulsory schooling laws, everyone is required
to use. However, the subsequent per curiam decisions, which
in effect determine that the separate-but-equal formula has no
place in public transportation, parks, golf courses, bath houses,
and beaches, apparently mean that claims for association prevail
over claims against association in all public facilities.
The principle of constitutional law compelling these exten-
sions of Brown v. Board of Education is not clear. But, whether
* based on reason or fiat, if the Constitution requires that claims
for association must prevail in class actions involving public
facilities where many of the members of the class affected by
the change from a segregated system to an integrated system
do not support the claim, that is, prefer disassociation, why
should the claim for association not prevail in the miscegenation
situation where the persons involved, individually and person-
ally, desire association?
On this analysis, Brown v. Board of Education and the sub-
sequent per curiam decisions make the case involving the con-
stitutionality of a state statute prohibiting miscegenation: an
a fortiori one of invalidity.
Yet, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized,
time and again, that the states have wide latitude to restrict
freedom of association where an overriding state interest justi-
14. Ibd.
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fies the restriction. 15 Certainly such an interest underlies a
statute preventing miscegenation.
"[T] he main constituent of the judicial process" is the writing
of principled decisions which rest "with respect to every step
that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons,"'16
"reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved. When no sufficient rea-
sons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value choices
... of a state, those choices must... survive . . . . The virtue or
demerit of a judgment turns . . . entirely on the reasons that
support it and their adequacy to maintain any choice of values
it decrees or ... to maintain the rejection of a claim that any
given choice should be decreed. 1 7
The Supreme Court of the United States, by failing to accord
judicial process in the state-enforced segregation cases, has made
for itself a nice dilemma in the handling of the miscegenation
problem. Its avenue of escape, assuming that evasion of the
issue will not go on forever, is not readily discernible.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
Historically the Louisiana Supreme Court has been rigorous
in requiring that the legislature, in delegating power to admin-
istrative agencies, set forth an intelligible statutory command
against which the propriety of specific exercises of discretion
may be judged. 18 Accordingly, it is not surprising that in
Banjavich v. Louisiana Licensing Board for Marine Divers, and
three companion cases, the court struck down, on the ground that
it constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an
administrative body, Act 196 of 1958, which regulates the occu-
pation of marine diving. 9
15. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) ; Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). Cf.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
16. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 H ARV. L..
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
17. Id. at 19-20.
18. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term-
Constitutional Law, 19 LOUISIANA LAW RaVIEW 364, 369-370 (1959).
19. 237 La. 467, 111 So.2d 505 (1959) ; Veverica Marine Divers, Inc. v. Lou-
isiana Licensing Board for Marine Divers, 237 La. 501, 111 So.2d 517 (1959);
Daspit v. Louisiana Licensing Board for Marine Divers, 237 La. 502, 111 So.2d
517 (1959) ; Inman v. Louisiana Licensing Board for Marine Divers, 237 La. 503,
1.1. So.2d 518 (1959).
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Although the opinion by Justice McCaleb expressed doubt
about the constitutionality of the statute as a matter of due
process, the decision was based solely on the ground that those
provisions of the statute which empower the Board to prescribe
examinations for all applicants for a license as "it deems neces-
sary and proper" constitute an improper delegation of legisla-
tive power because they commit to the untrammeled discretion
of the Board the power to say who is entitled to engage in the
business of marine diving without reference to any statutory
standard, general or specific. Such a delegation constitutes not
only a violation of the separation of powers concept, but it also
amounts to a denial of equal protection of the laws since there
is no prescribed rule or standard to which all persons similarly
situated must conform.
The most significant aspect of the decision is the holding that
there is a property right in pursuing the vocation of marine
diving, even though it is performed upon or under part of the
public domain, which, upon a showing of irreparable harm
worked by the statute and preliminary administrative action,
gives the plaintiffs standing to raise a constitutional question
and justifies equitable interference with the enforcement of a
statute the violation of which is a crime.
The decision on this point is difficult to reconcile, as the
three dissenting Justices pointed out, with earlier cases involving
the operation of "jitneys" on public streets20 and fishing with a
seine in fresh waters.21 The majority distinguished these cases
on the ground that they involved police regulation of the use of
public streets and public waters, whereas the statute at issue in
the instant case involved regulation of a particular business or
vocation, the place where the work was done being immaterial to
the purpose of the legislation.
The distinction is tenuous, but it is analytically defensible.
Moreover, the result is appealing. The proofs showed that to
deny the plaintiffs relief and hold that they could only raise the
issue of unconstitutionality as a defense to criminal or equitable
proceedings initiated by the administrative agency would deprive
them of an adequate remedy against a patently invalid statute.
20. LeBlanc v. New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 70 So. 212 (1915) ; Godfrey v. Ray,
169 La. 77, 124 So. 151 (1929).
21.: Louisiana Oyster & Fish Co. v. Police Jury, 126 La. 522, 52 So. 685
.(1910).' "
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LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL POWER TO
ISSUE INJUNCTIONS
In Roksvaag v. Reiy,22 the court had before it the question
of whether or not Revised Statutes 26:304, prohibiting the dis-
trict courts from issuing restraining orders or injunctions in
matters pertaining to the withholding, suspending, or revoking
of permits to sell alcoholic beverages, is unconstitutional on the
ground that it contravenes Article VII, Section 2, of the Louisi-
ana Constitution, which empowers the courts, in aid of their
respective jurisdictions, to issue any and all needful writs,
orders, and process.
Relying on such earlier cases as Douglas Public Service Cor-
poration v. Gaspard,28 which invalidated the so-called Little
Norris-LaGuardia Act,24 insofar as it limits the courts' juris-
diction to issue equitable relief in cases arising out of labor
disputes, on the ground of conflict with Article I, Section 6, of
the Louisiana Constitution, 25 the State Supreme Court struck
down the statute.
Justices McCaleb and Hawthorne dissented. The opinion by
the former raised two objections to the court's disposition of
the case: (1) that the plaintiff had no property right to engage
in the liquor business which justified equitable intervention;'
(2) that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy against the Col-
lector for refusing a permit, to wit, appealing to the district
court and proceeding by way of mandamus.
It is interesting to note that Justice McCaleb wrote the
court's opinion in the marine diving cases, holding, inter alia,
that there is a protectable right to engage in that business. On
the other hand, Justice Ponder, who dissented in the marine
diving cases on the ground in part that the plaintiffs' interests
were not justiciable, wrote the court's opinion in the Roksvaag
case, holding the other way as to the selling of beer.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE POWER To TAX
INTERSTATE BUSINESSES
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States last
22. 237 La. 1094, 113 So.2d 285 (1959).
23. 225 La. 972, 74 So.2d 182 (1954).
24. LA. R.S. 23:821-849, especially 841 and 844 (1950).
25. "All courts shall be open and every person for injury done him in his
rights, lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have adequate remedy by due
process of law and justice administered without denial, partiality or unreasonable
delay."
[Vol. XX
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Term upholding the power of a state to levy an apportioned net
income tax on a foreign corporation doing exclusively interstate
commerce within its boundaries 26 afford powerful support for
the decisions of the State Supreme Court in Brown-Forman Dis-
tillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue27 and International Shoe Co.
v. Fontenot.
28
In the former case the court held that the state net income
tax could be laid, apportionately, on a foreign corporation selling
whiskey in Louisiana even though its only local activity con-
sisted of so-called "missionary" men who called on wholesale
dealers and helped to set up displays at retail outlets. In the
latter case the court upheld the tax as applied to a foreign cor-
poration whose only contact with the state was through salesmen
who regularly and systematically solicited local retailers and dis-
played samples.
However, on September 14, 1959, Congress passed S. 2524,
which provides that no state may levy a tax on net income de-
rived within its boundaries by an out-of-state corporation if the
only activities within the taxing state by or on behalf of the
foreign corporation are the solicitation of orders for sales of
tangible personal property. Thus, the statute seems to make it
clear that Louisiana can no longer do what the state court said
it could do in the Brown-Forman and International Shoe cases.
There is a possible basis for challenging the constitutionality
of this statute on the ground that while Congress has authority
under the Commerce Clause to redistribute state and national
power to regulate interstate commerce,29 it lacks such power in
respect to the taxation of interstate commerce. However, op-
timism over the success of such an attack does not seem to be
justified. Even those members of the Supreme Court whose posi-
tions on free national markets versus state taxing power are
sharply opposed seem to agree that Congress has authority to
draw lines demarking the limits of state power to tax interstate
commerce and the incidents thereof. 0
It could also be argued that the statute offends due process
26. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959); Williams v. Stockham, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
27. 234 La. 651, 101 So.2d 70 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
28. 236 La. 279, 107 So.2d 640 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
29. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
30* See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944) (opinion
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter); J. D. Adams ,ifg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307
(1988) (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black).
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because it is a piecemeal effort which limits state authority only
in respect to foreign corporations selling "tangible personal
property." But this argument runs counter to a long line of
cases holding that if Congress has power with respect to a
matter, it need not exercise all of it in order to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Fifth Amendment. 81
There has been a great deal of speculation about the con-
stitutionality of the State Gas Gathering Tax,32 the subject of
which is the privilege of gathering gas, that is, transporting it,
after severance from the well, to the first meter at or near the
well. In Bel Oil Corporation v. Fontenot,3 a case involving gas
gathered by a Louisiana corporation for an intrastate purchaser,
the State Supreme Court struck down the statute on the ground
that it constitutes an additional "tax or license" on gas leases or
gas rights in contravention of Article X, Section 21, of the State
Constitution.84
Rights acquired under gas leases, under the reasoning of the
court, include exploring, producing, and marketing. The right
to market includes the right to transport and measure because
these activities are necessary to the effective exercise of gas
leases or rights. Moreover, they are an integral part of severing
gas and reducing it to possession.
The Bel Oil case involved intrastate commerce and the de-
cision is supported by an independent, adequate state ground.
Accordingly, it makes consideration of the federal question of
the constitutionality of the tax, under the Commerce Clause, as
applied to gas gathered for interstate markets, academic.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Henry G. McMahon*
OFFICERS
The Lawrason Act,' which provides for the government of
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
32. LA. R.S. 47:671-677 (1950).
33. Docket No. 44,761 (Nov. 9, 1959).
34. "Taxes may be levied on natural resources severed from the soil or water,
to be paid proportionately by the owners thereof at the time of severance; ..
No severance tax shall be levied by any Parish or other local subdivision of the
State.
"No further or additional tax or license shall be levied or imposed upon oil,
gas or sulphur leases or rights, nor shall any additional value be added to the
assessment of land, by reason of the presence of oil, gas or sulphur therein or
their production therefrom. .... "
LA. R.S. 47:631-646 (1950) levies a tax on the privilege of severance of gas.
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law SchooL
1. LA. R.S. 33:321-481 (1950).
[Vol. XX
